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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, 
vs 
ONAN FORD, 
Defendant/ 
Appe11ant. 
REPLY ERIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 890272-CA 
Cateqory No. 2 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is the Reply Brief of Appellant filed pursuant to 
Rule 24(c), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
QUASH THE LINEUP. 
The State cites the case of State v. Wettstein, 501 
P.2d 1084 (Utah, 1972), which recited several factors which 
should be considered in evaluatinq the validity of an 
identification procedure. Defendant arques that at least two of 
the six factors cited therein were not present in this case, and 
therefore the We 11 s t e i n case contains further basis to have 
quashed the lineup. Number two of the factors, as cited in the 
State's brief is, "Was there a necessity for usinq the type of 
identification employee?" anc number thice was, ''Were the 
circumstances of an urqent character?' 
Takinq the factors iii reverse order and applyinq them 
to the lineup procedure CoJL^ndant was subjected to, there were 
certainly no circumstances of an urqent nature which required an 
immediate show-up. Officer Phillips of the Oqden City Police 
Department was in charqe 01 the procedures, in answer to the 
question, "Would it have had any harm in your mind to have 
delayed this just ionq enouch to calx an attorney to come down?" 
Officer Phillips responded, 'As iar as the case, 1 can't see that 
it would have harmed anythinq...." (R. 829). based upon Officer 
Phillips1 own statements, tnui,: were not urqent or exiqent 
circumstances existinq in this case. Without such, the State was 
not justified in proceedinq witn the "show-up." The fact that 
the police were busy should not prejudice the Defendant by 
withhoidinq from him nqhts to which he is entitled pursuant to 
statute and the Constitution; i.e., the riqht for counsel to be 
present at any lineup. 
The State's arquruent chat it was necessary to use a 
show-up procedure is qroundiess. Tne Defendant was in the 
custody of the police ana the witness was a local resident, who 
could have been called back at any time to attempt to make an 
identification at a properly arranqed lineup. The Defendant 
requGstea several times for representation of an attorney (R. 
788/ 79C, 791, 805), which requests should have been immediately 
qran tea bat which were denied. 
The State also a^qL.es that the witness who identified 
the Defendant had ample opportunity tc view the Defendant face to 
face in a liqhted store, and that such fact supports the use of a 
show-up procedure instead of a lineup. However, when the witness 
observed the robber, he had on a qreen jacKet, a scarf up over 
his mouth, and a hat that was down over his forehead, revealinq 
only the nose and eyes of the Defendant (R. 323-324). Such items 
of ciochmq were found by police oflicers in this bushes at some 
time previous to Defendant's apprehension (R. 364). Therefore, 
the State's arqument that the witness viewed Deienaant under 
circumstances in which he could observe his dress and features is 
simply inaccurate. When the Defendant was viewed by the victim 
durinq the identification process, Defendant wab wearinq 
different clothmq than the robber wai observed wearinq by the 
witness in the store. 
The State further arques thui Detendant was qiven the 
benefit of the doubt by havinq two other Black males included in 
the show-up. However, just because they are Black does not mean 
they were similar in appearance to each other. One, in fact, was 
quite a bit liqhter in color, almost yellow-skinned, and short, 
with an Afro (R. 802 and 806) , which dij not resemble either of 
the other two individuals in any wuy. Surely, a lineup should 
not be structured such that the witness1 attention is directed to 
a particular witness. 
The law as cited in Appellant1s Brief provides that, "A 
suspect has the riqht to have an attorney present at any lineup, 
either before or after arrest," Utah Code Ann. J77-8-2 (1980), 
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and further that the entire procedure should be recorded, Utah 
Code Ann. 77-8-4 (1980). To deviate rrom the requirements of law 
is a violation 01 Defenuant's riqhts, particularly in a case 
where there is no qooc reason to have violated such riqhts. 
There were no exiqent circumstances requirinq anychinq less than 
providinq Defendant with all 01 his riqhts, and to allow the 
State to deviate from the requirements on the basis that such was 
merely a show-up and therefore chat the law does not apply, has 
the effect of unnecessarily woakinq the law ana violatinq 
Defendant's riqhts. Accordingly, this Court should conclude 
that because of the seriously flawed nature of the lineup 
procedures, the case should be reversed and remanded for a new 
trial, and an order entered suppressing all tainted evidence. 
Point Two 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS DUE TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
The state cites three cases, State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239 (Utah, 1988); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah, 
1987) , and State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1C42 (Utah, 1984) , as 
supportinq its arqument that no supposed error or defect has 
occurred; that no substantial riqht of the Defendant has been 
violated, ano that thereLore the errors attributed to the State 
in this case should be disregarded as harmless error. 
A review of the State's cited Cuses, however, reveals 
cases with facts that, are irrelevant in anaiyzinq the facts in 
the present case. The Laf fer iv case, supra, dealt with problems 
created by tne prosecutor in making erroneous statements in his 
openinq statement and statements which were allegedly improper 
assertions of fact and expressions of opinion in his ciosinq 
argument. The court in Laf for t.y, supra, founo no error in 
either the prosecutor's opening statement nor his ciosinq 
argument. Lafferty, supra, at 1254-1256. 
In the case of State v. Knight, supra, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed a conviction based on the prosecution's failure to 
disclose discovery to which the Defendant was entitled. State v. 
Knight, supra. 
Finally, in the case of State v. Tontana, supra, the 
court affirmed a conviction of Second Degree Murder over 
Defenoant's appeal based on a claim that an error m the giving 
of jury instructions had occurred. The court in Fontana held, 
11
 ...that there is no reasonable likelihood that a depraved 
indifference instruction that included an express treatment of 
the knowledge element would have produced a more favorable result 
for the defendant. Consequently, any error in that instruction 
was not prejudicial ana cannot serve as a basis lor reversal.11 
Fontana, supra, at 1049. 
None of the State's cases dealt with improper contact 
with a Defendant by prosecutors and police. 
In the present case, the State has committed 
indiscretions far in excess of mere improprieties in opening or 
closing arguments or ot arguing an improper, though not 
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prejudicial, jury ihstf ucticn. in fact, the State* s actions in 
this case qo further than the case of the state failinq to 
provide discoverable evidence, which case was reversed by the 
Utah Supreme Court . State v. Knight, supra. 
The Defendant in this case has been prejudiced in that 
his constitutional due process and equal protection riqhts have 
been violated. The Fifth Amendment to i;he Constitution of the 
United States states that no person shall be '"'...deprived of 
life, liberty, c. property without cue process or law " The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
states that no person within its jurisdiction shall be "...denied 
equal protection of the laws." 
The Sixth Amendment tc the United States Constitution 
reads, in part, as follows: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall...have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense." 
This Defendant has been subjected to the overwheiminq 
resources and power of the state without the advice of counsel in 
effectinq a plea neqotiation with officers of the state. 
In a case cited in ^ppoiiant's Lriei, Santobello v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 237, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), the 
United States Supreme Court, in discussinq plea barqainmq, 
stated : 
"The disposition of criminal charqes by agreement 
between the prosecutor and the accusec, sometimes 
loosely called !piea bargaining,' is an essential 
component of the administration of justice. Properly 
administered, it is to be ^ncouraqed . If every 
criminal charge were suojecteo to a full-scale trial, 
tne state ana the federal government would need to 
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multiply by many times the number ot judqes and court 
facilities. 
"Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not 
only an essential part of the process, but a hiqhly 
desirable part for many reasons..." Santobello v. New 
York, 30 L.Ld.2c, at 432. 
Due to the lact that the State of Utah is attemptinq to 
take this Defendant's liberty from him, the Defendant should 
certainly be accorded due process and equal protection of the 
laws. In that the law allows him to have the assistance of 
counsel when defenuinq himself aqainst criminal charqes and 
inasmuch as the Defendant had retained defense counsel, part of 
the due process and c\uul protection of the ±aws afforded to the 
Defendant should be the utilization of his retained counsel. 
The Washinqtoii State Supreme Court, in the case of 
State v. Swindell, 607 P.2d S52, stated: 
"The presence of counsel durinq all staqes of plea 
barqaininq is mandated by the courts. In Bordenki rcher 
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363; 98 S.Ct. 663, 668; 54 
L.ED. 2d 204 (1978), the U. S. Supreme Court noted, 
fplea barqaininq rlows from the "mutuality of 
advantaqe" to defendants ano prosecutors, each with his 
own reasons for wantinq to avoid trial. Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742. at 752; 90 S.Ct/l463, 
1474; 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Detendants advised by 
competent counsel and protected by other procedural 
safequards are presumptively capable of intelliqent 
choice and response to prosecutorial persuasion and 
unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.' 
Further, in Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475-76; 
65 S.Ct. 363, 36b; 89 L.Ed. 398 (1945), the court 
stated, 'Only counse. could discern from the facts 
whether a plea of not quilty to the offense charqe or a 
plea ot quilty to a lesser charqe would be appropriate. 
A layman is usually no match for the skilled prosecutor 
whom he confronts in the courtroom. He needs the aid 
of counsel, lest he be the victim of over zealous 
prosecutors of the law's complexity or of his own 
iqnorance or Lev* l iderinont. ' " 
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In the present case, thouqh Defendant contacted state 
officials to seek out a plea negotiation, the State was clearly 
wronq in pursuing discussions with the Derencant without 
involving his attorney. Once the discussions ensueci and the 
proposed bargain was offered ty police officers and 
representatives of the county attorney's office, Defendant made a 
request two or three times to be allowed to consult with his 
counsel, Merlin Calver, which requests were denied, (R. 719-7 21, 
attached hereto as part of tiv_- addendum.) 
The State wants to minimize the effect of what, happened 
in this case, claiming thac Mr. Calver, Defendant's retained 
attorney, entered the case after Defendant?s preliminary hearing 
and had "simply filed several pre-trial motions," presumably 
suggesting that Mr. Calver hau not done enough to justify 
standinq as Defendant's attorney. There is no question that Mr. 
Calver was Defendant's attorney and that Mr. Calver should have 
been involved in the plea discussions between the State and the 
Defendant. 
The State suqqests that the prosecutor at the trial was 
"shielded" from any knowledge or information disclosed in the 
sting operation. Though the record admittedly reflects testimony 
supporting such claim, as noted in the State's brief, it is 
impossible to know what really takes place in a small county 
attorney's office, particularly when the prosecutor involved in 
the case, Gary Heward, was one ol the prosecutors who made direct 
contact with the Defendant without Defendant's counsel being 
present (R. 663-667) and helped in making decisions involved in 
the furtherance of the plea bargain through contact with the 
detectives involved in the case, with the detectives acting as 
middle men in communications involving the Defendant and the 
prosecutor's office (R. 667-669). Mr. Heward also stated that he 
was well aware of the fact that the Defendant had an attorney in 
this matter (R. 669). 
Further prejudice arguably occurred in that, as part of 
the plea negotiation, Defendant made tapea admissions involving 
his own charge in order to further the plea bargain he had agreed 
to. Though there are claims by the State that this information 
was not utilized, there is no way of knowing what effect Mr. 
Ford's statements had on the State's case and what holes, if any, 
his statements in the case may have plugged. Though the State 
denies the possibility of a better plea bargain, it is unknown 
what an attorney, thiough plea negotiations, could have obtained 
for this Defendant. In essence, his right to plea bargain a 
better deal than he was able to negotiate for himself has been 
permanently denied to him. Simply remanding the case for a new 
trial would be useless, in that any defense attorney working on 
Defendant's case is rendered, to some degree, useless. 
Accordingly, this Court should conclude that the pre-trial 
irregularities which occurred were prejudicial and illegal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foreqomq, Appellant requests that 
Defendant's conviction be reversed, and the case be dismissed or 
in the alternative that he be qranted a new trial with an order 
that all tainted evidence be suppressed. 
Respectfully submitted this Q ^ day of September, 
1989. 
ROBERT L. TROLRER 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that on the f/tjx day of September, 
1969, 1 mailed, postaqe prepaid, four true and correct copies of 
the foreqoinq REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Dan R. Larsen, 
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitoal, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114. 
ihktjd^ 
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A No, that isn't- For him to go over this 
thoroughly with me, it would have tooken more than, as Reed 
Richards and Heward says, three minutes. No, he didn't go 
into detail anything about this agreement with me. 
Q Do you consider yourself to be bright, 
intelligent? 
A I never have. 
Q Did you graduate from high school? 
A No. 
Q How far did you go in school? 
A I dropped out in the 7th. 
Q 7th grade. Did you ever request an attorney be 
present to advise you as to whether this was a good 
negotiation or not? 
A Twice, I think three times. I'm not sure, but 
twice I know of. And I did this once in the jail with Lucas 
and Soakai standing there. I said, well, let me think about 
it for a minute here, and I think I should call Merlin Calver 
and talk to him and see what he thinks. Merlin Calver 
shouldn't know anything about this right now. 
Q Who said that? 
A This is coming from Soakaifs mouth. Merlin 
doesn't need to know, this is between us, it goes no further 
than here. Then took me over to the detectives section to 
give him a statement, and hef s putting rae in a room and let mel 
176 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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25 
call Robin, and she had told me, does Merlin know anything 
about it, and I said no. Then I come back and asked, can I 
call Merlin now. No, we got to take you back now so we can 
get this set up. I said okay. 
Q Did you find it strange that they would not want 
you to talk to your attorney? 
A I really didn't know what was happening because 
I made a sudden move that I don't think benefited me in any 
way. 
Q Did you think at that time that it did benefit 
you, somewhat? 
A Going to the halfway house to me would have. 
Q Were there any other occasions when you were 
told not to contact your attorney? 
A As I was going to Davis County, Lucas and Soakai 
drove me down"there. Before we went there, we went to Robin' 
and picked up the other diamonds. Come back to Davis County 
and he said, now, don't call your attorney until after we've 
made this call, and I didn't see him until Saturday. And 
that Saturday we made the call, and then that following 
Monday, I called Merlin Calver. 
! Q 
agreement 
A 
Q 
to 
And you, in fact, did follow through with your 
testify in the Scott case; is that true? 
Unfortunately, yes. 
At the time you testified, did you understand 
177 
1
 what consideration you would be getting in your own case? 
2
 A It had left my mind. I was thinking on whether 
3
 I really should testify or not. Knowing that if, in fact, I-
4
 was found guilty, no matter where I was placed, it would stil! 
5 be a problem. It endangers my life. I knew that. 
6
 Q So at that time, you did have a little more 
7 clear understanding of what they actually had offered you; 
8 is that true? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Did you realize it wasn't to be placed in a 
11 halfway house? 
12 A No. 
13 Q You still thought it was to be placed in a 
14 halfway house? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Hadn't Merlin Calver discussed it wasn't going 
17 to be in a halfway house? 
18 A Monday he did. 
19 Q Was that after or before you testified? 
20 A After I testified. That agreement made 
21 I something, that gun enhancement was somewhat okay, and I 
22 I had explained to him, hey, they had guaranteed me a halfway 
23 |house, what do you mean it isn't nothing. 
24 | Q But even after talking to Mr. Calver, you went 
25 |ahead and testified knowing that the deal as it was on the 
178 
(c) is armed with a deadly weapon or possesses 
or attempts to use any explosive or deadly 
weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
1988 
76-6-204. Burglary of a vehicle — Charge of 
other offense. 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle 
with intent to commit a felony or theft is guilty of a 
burglary of a vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of 
Subsection (1) shall not preclude a charge for a com-
mission of any other offense. I973 
76-6-205. Manufacture or possess ion of instru-
ment for burglary or theft. 
Any person who manufactures or possesses any in-
strument, tool, device, article, or other thing adapted, 
designed, or commonly used in advancing or facilitat-
ing the commission of any offense under circum-
stances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge 
that some person intends to use the same in the com-
mission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 1973 
76-6-206. Criminal trespass. 
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means in-
trusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under 
ciitnimstances not amounting to burglary as defined 
in Sections 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on prop-
erty and; 
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or injury to 
any person thereon or damage to any prop-
erty thereon; or 
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, other 
than theft or a felony; 
(iii) Is reckless as to whether his presence 
will cause fear for the safety of another. 
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, 
he enters or remains on property as to which no-
tice against entering is given by: 
(i) Personal communication to the actor by 
the owner or someone with apparent author-
ity to act for the owner, or 
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously 
designed to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to 
come to the attention of intruders. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (2Xa) is a class C 
misdemeanor unless it was committed in a dwell-
ing, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor. 
A violation of Subsection (2Kb) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this sec-
tion: 
(a) That the property was open to the pub-
lic when the actor entered or remained; and 
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially 
interfere with the owner's use of the property. 
1974 
P A R T 3 
BOBBERY 
Section 
76-6-301. 
76-6-302. 
Robbery. 
Aggravated robbery. 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking 
of personal property in the possession of another from 
his person, or immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear. 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 1973 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, 
knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon; 
or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the first de-
gree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be 
deemed to be "in the course of committing a robbery" 
if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the com-
mission of, or in the immediate flight after the at-
tempt or commission of a robbery. 1975 
P A R T 4 
THEFT 
Section 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses. 
76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation. 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
76-6-406. Theft by extortion. 
76-6-407. Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly de-
livered property. 
76-6-408. Receiving" stolen property — Duties of 
pawnbrokers. 
76-6-409. Theft of services. 
76-6-409.1. Devices for theft of services — Seizure 
and destruction — Civil actions for 
damages. 
76-6-409.3. Theft of utility services. 
76-6-410. Theft by person having custody of prop-
erty pursuant to repair or rental 
agreement 
76-6-411. Repealed. 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Ac-
tion for treble damages against re-
ceiver of stolen property. 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property* means anything of value, in-
cluding real estate, tangible and intangible per-
sonal property, captured or domestic animals and 
birds, written instruments or other writings 
representing or embodying rights concerning 
real or personal property, labor, services, or oth-
erwise containing anything of value to the 
owner, commodities of a public utility nature 
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, 
steam, or water, and trade secrets, meaning the 
whole or any portion of any scientific or technical 
information, design, process, procedure, formula 
or invention which the owner thereof intends to 
be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to 
bring about a transfer of possession or of some 
other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another, in relation to 
labor or services, to secure performance thereof; 
and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduc-
tion. 
X / I 
guilty or no contest and be sentenced or on which bail 
may be forfeited. With the magistrate's approval a 
person may voluntarily forfeit bail without appear-
ance being required in any case of a class B misde-
meanor or less. Such voluntary forfeiture of bail shall 
be entered as a conviction and treated the same as if 
the accused pleaded guilty. 
(2) If the person cited willfully fails to appear be-
fore a magistrate pursuant to a citation issued under 
Section 77-7-18, or pleads not guilty to the offense 
charged, or does not deposit bail on or before the date 
set for his appearance, an information shall be filed 
and proceedings held in accordance with the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and all other applicable provi-
sions of this code, which information shall be deemed 
an original pleading; provided, however, that the per-
son cited may by written agreement waive the filing 
of the information and thereafter the prosecution 
may proceed on the citation notwithstanding any pro-
visions to the contrary. i960 
77-7-22. Failure to appear as misdemeanor. 
Any person who willfully fails to appear before a 
court pursuant to a citation issued under the provi-
sions of Section 77-7-18 is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor, regardless of the disposition of the charge 
upon which he was originally cited. i960 
77-7-23. Delivery of prisoner arrested without 
warrant — Information — Violation as 
misdemeanor. 
When an arrest is made without a warrant by a 
peace officer or private person, the person arrested 
shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken to the 
magistrate in the precinct of the county or municipal-
ity in which the offense occurred, and in information, 
stating the charge against the person shall be made 
before such magistrate. In the event the magistrate of 
the precinct is not available, the arrested person shall 
be taken before the available magistrate nearest to 
the scene of the alleged offense. Any officer or person 
violating any of the provisions of this section shall be 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. i960 
CHAPTER 8 
LINEUPS 
Section 
77-8-1. Order of magistrate — Grounds — Ar-
rested suspect's appearance without or-
der. 
77-8-2. Suspect's right to have attorney present. 
77-8-3. Conduct of peace officer. 
77-8-4. Record of proceedings — Access by suspect. 
77-8-1. Order of magistrate — Grounds — Ar-
rested suspect's appearance without 
order. 
(1) A magistrate may issue an order requiring a 
suspect to appear in a lineup when probable cause 
exists to believe a crime has been committed and 
there is reason to believe the suspect committed it. 
(2) A suspect who has been arrested, and is in cus-
tody, may be required by a peace officer to appear in a 
lineup without a court order. 
(3) Upon application of any suspect and a showing 
of good cause, a magistrate may order a lineup. i980 
77-8-2. Suspect's right to have attorney present. 
A suspect has the right to have his attorney present 
at any lineup. The magistrate or party in charge of 
the lineup shall notify the suspect of this right. Every 
suspect unable to employ counsel shall be entitled to 
representation by an attorney appointed by a magis-
trate for a lineup either before or after an arrest. 
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77-8-3. Conduct of peace officer. 
The peace officers conducting a lineup shall not at-
tempt to influence the identification of any particular 
suspect. i960 
77-8-4. Record of proceedings — Access by sus-
pect. 
The entire lineup procedure shall be recorded, in-
cluding all conversations between the witnesses and 
the conducting peace officers. The suspect shall have 
access to and may make copies of the record and any 
photographs taken of him or any other persons in 
connection with the lineup. i960 
CHAPTER 9 
UNIFORM ACT ON FRESH PURSUIT 
Section 
77-9-1. Authority of peace officer of another state. 
77-9-2. Procedure after arrest 
77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of this state be-
1
 yond normal jurisdiction. 
77-9-1. Authority of peace officer of another 
1
 state. 
A peace officer of another state or the District of 
L
 Columbia who enters this state in fresh pursuit and 
I continues in fresh pursuit of a person in order to ar-
- rest him on the ground that he is reasonably believed 
to have committed a felony in another state, has the 
» same authority to arrest and hold a person in custody 
' as a peace officer of this state. Fresh pursuit does not 
f require instant action, but pursuit without unreason-
l able delay. i960 
> 
i 77-9-2. Procedure after arrest. 
i An officer who has made an arrest pursuant to Sec-
) tion 77-9-1 shall without unnecessary delay take the 
person arrested before a magistrate of the county in 
which the arrest was made. The magistrate shall con-
duct a hearing to determine the lawfulness of the 
arrest. If he finds the arrest was lawful, the magis-
trate may commit the person arrested for a reason-
able time or may admit the person to bail pending 
extradition proceedings. i960 
77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of this state 
beyond normal jurisdiction. 
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any gov-
ernmental entity of this state may exercise a peace 
officer's authority beyond the limits of such officer's 
normal jurisdiction as follows: 
t (a) When in fresh pursuit of an offender for the 
purpose of arresting and holding that person in 
 custody or returning the suspect to the jurisdic-
 tion where the offense was committed; 
 (b) When a public offense is committed in such 
lm officer's presence; 
h (c) When participating in an investigation of 
 criminal activity which originated in such offi-
cer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation w i t h the 
g local authority; 
io (d) W h e n called to ass is t peace officers of an-
other jurisdiction. 
L (2) Any peace officer, prior to tak ing such autho-
i rized action, shall notify and receive approval of the 
>f local law enforcement authority, or if such prior con-
tact is not reasonably possible, notify the local law 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT U 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT m 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT V m 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT EX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XH 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—-The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
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on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-
lot, the President. But in choosing the President, the 
votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of 
the death or other constitutional disability of the 
President.—The person having the greatest number 
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the 
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres-
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the 
United States. 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap-
pointment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the United States, Repre-
sentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citi-
zens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President, 
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any State, who, having previously 
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an 
officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer 
of any State, to support the Constitution of the 
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to 
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — 
Debts of the Confederacy and claims 
not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for pay-
ment of pensions and Bounties for services in sup-
pressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be ques-
tioned But neither the United States nor any State 
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of 
any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to 
disqualify.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or 
color not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude. 
S e c 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this arti-
cle by appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
